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NOTE
People v. Shirley: The Use of Hypnotically
Enhanced Testimony at Trial
INTRODUCTION

The use of hypnosis has been helpful in enhancing the recollection of an individual's memory. Forensic hypnosis is the use of
the scientific technique of hypnosis for benefit in both civil and
criminal investigations.' Hypnosis has been accepted for use in
investigation purposes, 2 however, its use for enhancement of testimony is debated. 3 A minority of jurisdictions admit hypnotically
enhanced testimony, while other jurisdictions condition the admissibility on an adherence to procedural safeguards initiated
before, during, and after the hypnotic session. 4 A majority of jurisdictions which have addressed the issue, have excluded such

testimony because of the unreliability of hypnosis as a scientifi-

cally accepted technique.5
Recently, in People v. Shirley,6 the California Supreme Court
1. W. HIBBARD & R. WORRING, FORENSIC HYPNOSIS, THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as

HIBBARD & WORRING]. For the purposes of this Note, the terms hypnosis and forensic hypnosis will be used interchangeably. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying
text for a more precise definition and explanation of the technique of hypnosis.
2. See Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of
Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 579-80 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Spector & Foster].
3. See infra notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
4. The minority rule which admits hypnotically enhanced testimony is composed of two distinct viewpoints. Under the first viewpoint, the rule is that hypnotically derived testimony is admissible evidence. This rule is followed by the Ninth
Circuit in federal court as well as the jurisdictions of Florida, Louisiana, Missouri,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wyoming. See infra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the major cases adhering to this viewpoint.
There are also jurisdictions following the minority rule concerning the use of pretrial hypnosis which condition the admissibility of the hypnotically enhanced testimony upon an adherence to a set of procedural safeguards. This view has been
followed in Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. See infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of these procedural safeguards.
5. The jurisdictions of Arizona, California, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia have excluded the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony at trial. See infra note 25 and accompanying text for a
discussion of applicable cases following this viewpoint.
6. 31 Cal. 3d 18,641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, mod. 31 Cal. 3d 918(a) (1982),
cert. denied 103 S.Ct. 133 (1982).
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ruled that hypnotically enhanced testimony is not admissible evidence.7 Shortly thereafter, the court modified its ruling granting
an exception in situations where a criminal defendant testifies on
his own behalf.8 In its modified opinion the Supreme Court of
California has also deferred ruling on the retroactivity of the Shirley decision.9
This Note will trace the scientific theory and legal application
of the use of hypnosis, analyze the defendant exception rule for
hypnotically enhanced testimony as enunciated in Shirley, and
then propose safeguards for the defendant exception situations.
In formulating these safeguards, particular reliance will be placed
upon jurisdictions which admit hypnotically derived testimony.
Finally, this Note will address the extent to which the Shirley decision should be applied retroactively in criminal cases.
I.

THE SCIENTIFIC THEORY BEHIND HYPNOSIS

Hypnosis is a state of mind similar to sleep in which the subject
is open to the suggestions and commands of the hypnotist.' 0
There are seven stages in the process of hypnosis." During these
various stages, the memory recollection of a certain witness or vic7. Id. at 54, 641 P.2d at 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
8. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
9. See the text of the modified decision on the retroactivity issue. 31 Cal. 3d at
67, n.53, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273, n.53 (1982). The Shirley decision was modified in 31
Cal. 3d at 918(a), the California Reporter published the entire Shirley decision as
modified. The decision as modified however, did not appear in the Pacific Reporter.
For a discussion of the retroactivity problems remaining unaddressed as a result of
Shirley, see infra notes 118-58 and accompanying text.
10. E. BLOCK, HYPNOsIs: A NEW TOOL IN CRIME DETECTION 11 (1976). For
additional definitions of hypnosis see Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced
by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REv. 1203, 1206-08 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,Admissibility]. See also Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 570.
11. See HIBBARD & WORRING, supra note 1, at 83. The seven stages of hypnosis
are listed as follows:
(1) Preparationandpreinductiontalk - This stage is for maximizing the favorable
factors and minimizing the unfavorable factors in the ensuing hypnosis.
(2) Inductionproper - This stage is the initiation of the process wherein the subject is hypnotized.
(3) Deepening - In this stage the hypnotist will maximize the hypnotic state of the
subject.
(4) Challengingandtestingfor trance depth - Here the hypnotist will question the
subject to make certain that he is in a sufficient trance depth so as to elucidate
hypnotic phenomena.
(5) Elicitation of hypnotic phenomena - In this stage the hypnotic phenomena
(such as enhanced memory recall) is actually produced.
(6) Awakening - In this stage the hypnotist gradually begins to awaken the
subject.
(7) Postinduction - Finally, the hypnotist briefs the subject on the entire hypnotic
session.
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tim of a crime can be enhanced. 12 It is thus apparent that hypnosis can be a powerful investigative and offensive tool for law
enforcement officials.
The use of hypnosis has been acknowledged as a legitimate and

scientific means of treatment in the medical community. 13 This
scientific acceptance of hypnosis for medical purposes, however,
has not led to universal acceptance in the legal community.
Hypnosis in the legal field is used primarily for the purpose of
enhancing the subject's recollection of the alleged crime.' 4 Hyp-

nosis could thus be described as a tool which aids the memory of
the subject.' 5 Proponents of the use of hypnosis in the legal field

rely on two factors to support their views. First, these proponents
insist that all impressions relating to sensory perceptions are recorded and stored permanently in the memory, much in the same
12. W. BRYAN, JR., LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS 202-03 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as BRYAN].
13. Diamond, Inherent Problemsin the Use ofPretrialHypnosis on a Prospective
Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313, 317 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Diamond]. For a discussion relating to the reliability of hypnosis in the legal field see infra notes 21-52
and accompanying text.
14. Present recollection refreshed is the use of a writing or a technique (i.e., hypnosis) to facilitate the memory of a witness. See 3 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 758
(Chadbourn Rev. 1982 Supp.) Note that present recollection refreshed should not be
confused with past recollection recorded. The latter is generally a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The witness on the stand is unable to testify as to the events
in question based upon his present memory. The attorney, however, will attempt to
introduce a written document of the event in question based upon the witness' accurate impressions when the document was made. The document itself will be admitted
into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule if:
(I) The recollection was fresh in the memory of the witness when the recording
was made.
(2) The witness verifies that the document is a correct record of the events in question although the witness need not have prepared the document himself.
(3) The original recording is provided if it is available.
(4) The record is shown to the opponent on demand for inspection and crossexamination.
(5) The record goes to the jury if requested.
(6) Present recollection of the witness testifying is lacking.
For a discussion of past recollection recorded see generally 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 738-54 (Chadbourn Rev. 1982 Supp.).
15. See BRYAN, supra note 12, at 202-03. But see Note, Admissibility, supra note
10, at 1208: "Laymen often think of hypnosis as an infallible and extremely powerful
memory aid, but research has shown that this notion is not correct."
Cf. Diamond, supra note 13, at 317:
The existence of various conflicting theories that attempt to explain the phenomenon of hypnosis does not mean that hypnotism is unscientific. As
medical treatment it is indeed legitimate and scientific. This fact, however,
has no relevancy whatsoever to its use in a legal context or to the question of
the admissibility of testimony of witnesses who have had their recall
manipulated by hypnosis. Unfortunately, this kind of uncritical leap, as
well as reliance on unscientific claims, has typified legal treatment of
hypnosis.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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manner as a picture is stored on a videotape machine. 16 The theory is that hypnosis facilitates the reformulation of these impres-

sions and brings them to the forefront. 17 Second, the proponents

assert that a hypnotic subject always tells the truth. 18 What underlies this assertion is the theory that the hypnotic process is accurate and reliable. 19 Many scientific studies, however, indicate

that neither memory recall nor reliability for truthfulness support
the assertions of the proponents of hypnotically derived

testimony.

20

The conflicting viewpoints among the experts regarding the use
of hypnosis in the legal field indicate that this issue must be analyzed rigidly. The use of hypnosis has been addressed by several
jurisdictions in the United States. The fact that most of these ju-

risdictions have adopted conflicting standards regarding the use of
pretrial hypnosis indicates that this issue is indeed perplexing.
II.

THE LEGAL HISTORY OF HYPNOSIS

Hypnosis is a scientific technique. 2 1 The admissibility of any
scientific technique into evidence is governed by the case of Frye v.
United States.22 In Frye, the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia refused to permit a defendant charged with second degree murder to introduce a favorable result from a lie detector test
into evidence.2 3 The Frye rule conditioned the admissibility of a
new scientific method of proof into evidence upon a showing that
the technique be accepted as reliable in the scientific community
in which it developed. 24 Several jurisdictions have excluded the
16. See BRYAN, supra note 12, at 202-03. See also M. REISER, HANDBOOK OF
INVESTIGATIVE HYPNOSIS 158-60 (1980).

17. Id.
18. BRYAN, supra note 12, at 245-46.
19. Id. at 275-76.
20. See generally, Diamond, supra note 13 and Note,Admissibility, supra note 10.
These studies indicate that the oversuggestive nature of the hypnotic process results in
altered memories of those individuals hypnotized. The conclusion is that the use of
hypnosis to refresh one's memory is not reliable.
21. See HIBBARD & WORRING, supra note 1, at 3.
22. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
23. Id. at 1014. The court stated the following regarding the new scientific lie
detector test: "We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained
such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." Id. Note the court's use of
the term systolic blood pressure deception test. This term has been abandoned in
modem case law for the more familiar term of lie detector test.
24. Id. See also Falk, Posthypnotic Testimony--Wpitness Competency and the Fulcrum of ProceduralSafeguards, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 30, n.3 (1982) (citing application of the Frye test to the following scientific methods of crime detection); United
States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (forward-looking infrared system);
United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556-58 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic analy-
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introduction of hypnotically enhanced testimony into evidence,
reasoning that hypnosis is not sufficiently accepted in the scientific community to warrant admission at the present time. 25 These
jurisdictions have thus used the Frye rule to exclude such
testimony.
Some jurisdictions, on the other hand, have ruled that hypnosis
is accepted in the scientific community as a reliable method of
proof when there has been an adherence to procedural safeguards. 26 This viewpoint uses the Frye rule to admit hypnotically
sis of human hair); People v. Cox, 85 Mich. App. 314, 317, 271 N.W.2d 216, 217-18
(Ct. App. 1978) (brevital-sodium test); People v. Smith, 110 Misc. 2d 118, 124-26, 443
N.Y.S.2d 551, 556-57 (Dutchess County Ct. 198 1) (odontological identification of bite
marks); State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d, 808, 813, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978)
(breathalyzer); Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in CriminalCases, 25
OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 23-25 (1964) (truth serums).
25. See e.g., State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555 (1980)
holding that a witness who has been under hypnosis may not testify where the testimony may be the product of the hypnotic session. Cf. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226,
232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981) which held that the testimony of a witness hypnotized
before trial is inadmissible from the time of the hypnotic session forward. Compare
Mena to State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) in
which the same court ruled that although hypnotically enhanced testimony is inadmissible as evidence, a witness is not prevented from testifying at a trial to those facts
remembered prior to the hypnotic session. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d
775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, mod. 31 Cal. 3d 918(a) (1982), cert. denied 103 S.Ct. 133
(1982) holding that hypnotically enhanced testimony is not admissible evidence; see
also People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897); Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110,
205 S.E. 2d 231 (1974) excluding statements made while under hypnosis. Cf. Creamer
v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 138, 205 S.E. 2d 240, 242 (1974) (testimony admissible where
the facts of the crime are corroborated by statements made to the authorities prior to
the hypnotic session thereby decreasing the likelihood that the testimony was a product of hypnosis). Other jurisdictions also continue to exclude hypnotically derived
testimony. E.g., Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983); Lawson v. State, 280
N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1979); State v. Conley, 6 Kan. App. 2d 280, 627 P.2d 1174 (Ct.
App. 1981); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982)
ruling that hypnosis does not satisfy the Frye standard for admissibility; Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 579, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Hangsleben, 86
Mich. App. 718, 727-28, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Ct. App. 1978) ruling that the reliability of statements made under hypnosis by establishing the qualifications of the
hypnotist is not an adequate foundation for the admissibility of scientific evidence;
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980) in which the court held that a
witness who previously submits to pretrial hypnosis may not testify at a criminal trial
regarding the subject matter of the hypnotic session. See also State v. Palmer, 210
Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App.
1975); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981) all excluding
hypnotic testimony. State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974) (hypnotic
testimony inadmissible if offered for its truth); Burnett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 765, 76869 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) holding that hypnotically enhanced testimony is generally
not admissible and that any taped hypnotic session between a hypnotist and defendant would be protected by the attorney-client privilege; Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 715, 204 S.E. 2d 414, 419 (1974) holding that hypnotically
enhanced testimony is unreliable because the person under hypnosis can manufacture
or invent false statements.
26. See e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97
N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (Ct. App. 1982); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d
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derived testimony on the theory that by the use of procedural safe-

guards initiated before, during and after the hypnotic session, the
reliability of the testimony is increased. 27 Only testimony so scrutinized is admitted into evidence.
There are also jurisdictional viewpoints that the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of evidence. The leading case adhering to this view is
Hardingv. State.28 In Harding,the defendant allegedly assaulted
the victim with the intent to rape and murder her.29 The victim
submitted to the use of hypnosis to refresh her vague recollection
of the incident and was thereafter able to recall the events of the
crime. 30 At trial, the victim was permitted to testify against the
31
defendant and the testimony helped to result in a conviction. 32

Maryland's Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction.

The court ruled that the use of hypnosis to enhance the victim's

memory only affected the weight of the testimony.3 3 Thus, under
845 (Ct. App. 1982). See also State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386
(1983) requiring a pretrial hearing to make certain that there was no impermissible
suggestiveness during the hypnotic session. See infra notes 91-102 and accompanying
text for a detailed discussion of the procedural safeguards adopted by these decisions
before the hypnotically enhanced testimony is admissible as evidence.
See additionally, State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 192, 644 P.2d
1266, 1278 (1982) citing the procedural safeguards adopted by Illinois in People v.
Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (Ct. App. 1979). Smrekar established a
four step requirement before hypnotically enhanced testimony would be declared admissible, the requirements were: (1) the hypnotist must be competent, (2) suggestion
must not be used during the hypnotic session, (3) any identifications made by the use
of hypnosis must be corroborated by other substantial evidence, and (4) the witness
must have had an ample opportunity to view the defendant.
The jurisdiction of Tennessee has also required adherence to certain minimal procedures at hypnotic sessions. See State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1981) citing United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199 n.12 (9th Cir. 1978) cert.
denied 439 U.S. 1006 (1978) (stenographic records of hypnotic session should be the
minimum requirement conditioning the admissibility of such evidence). Glebock also
established an elaborate procedure whereby the hypnotist would also be called upon
to testify in order to lay the foundation to condition the admissibility of the hypnotically enhanced testimony. The following factors were to be established in order to lay
a proper foundation: (1) the hypnotist should be considered an expert in the use of
hypnosis, (2) the expert should describe the manner in which the hypnotic session was
conducted, (3) the expert should testify as to whether the subject under hypnosis has
the increased capacity to remember as a result of the hypnotic session, (4) the expert
should be questioned concerning the possibility to confabulate while under hypnosis,
and (5) the expert should be questioned on whether the subject of the hypnotic session
has the capacity for telling deliberate lies. State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 904-05
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
27. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
28. 5 Md. Ap. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968).
29. Id. at 232, 246 A.2d at 304.
30. Id. at 234, 246 A.2d at 305.
31. Id. at 232, 246 A.2d at 304.
32. Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312.
33. UnderHarding the threshold question regarding the admissibility of hypnotically derived testimony was determined as unnecessary. The court determined that
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Harding,34 hypnotically derived testimony was admissible

evidence.
The Harding rule was essentially repudiated by Maryland in
Polk v. State.35 In Polk, the defendant was convicted of sexual
offenses committed against an eight-year-old.3 6 At trial, the child
was permitted to testify about the incident after he had been subjected to hypnosis by the local authorities.3 7 The conviction was

reversed on appeal.3 8 In this instance, Maryland's Court of Spe-

the testimony was admissible, however, the trier of fact would weigh the factor that
the testimony of the witness was elicited by the use of hypnosis. Accordingly, the fact
finder would be able to disregard the testimony of the witness if it so desired. An
analogy can be drawn as to the competency of a witness to testify who is mentally
incapable or immature. Most courts currently permit such a witness to testify while
providing the jury with cautionary instructions that it must weigh such testimony accordingly. The Harding court apparently used the same approach for a witness who
testifies after his recollection has been refreshed by the use of hypnosis. For a discussion of the competency of an immature or mentally incapable witness; see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 62 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].

34. The minority of jurisdictions which have addressed the hypnotic testimony
issue have adopted the Hardingrule. The Ninth Circuit has applied the Harding rule.
See Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974). These two cases dealt with the weight, as
opposed to the admissibility, of evidence derived from the use of hypnosis in civil
cases. The Ninth Circuit extended this rule to criminal cases in United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1006 (1978). The Adams
court, however, expressed the following concern regarding the use of pretrial
hypnosis:
We are concerned, however, that investigatory use of hypnosis on persons
who may later be called upon to testify in court carries a dangerous potential
for abuse. Great care must be exercised to insure that statements [made]
after hypnosis are the product of the subject's own recollection, rather than
of recall tainted by suggestions received while under hypnosis.
Id. at 198-99 (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834,
838 (S.D. Fla. 1982); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich.
1977) both holding that hypnosis affects credibility but not admissibility. There are
also state views following the Hardingrule; see Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1979); but cf. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 90 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983) in which the
same court applied a relevancy balancing test to determine the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony. Under Brown the appellate court held this issue must
be examined on a case-by-case basis.
Other jurisdictions, however, have continued to adhere to the Harding rule. See
e.g., Pearson v. State, 441 N.E. 2d 468 (Ind. 1982); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La.
1983); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacated 450 U.S. 1027
(1981); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jorgenson, 8
Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1971); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo.
1982). See also People v. District Court, 652 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) where
the Supreme Court of Colorado refused to rule on the hypnotic testimony issue. See
generally, Annot., Admissibility ofHypnotic Evidence at CriminalTrial, 92 A.L.R. 3d
444 (1979) for a thorough analysis of applicable case law concerning the admissibility
of hypnotically derived evidence.
35. 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (Ct. Sp. App. 1981).
36. Id. at 382, 427 A.2d at 1041-42.
37. Id. at 385, 427 A.2d at 1043-44.
38. Id. at 396, 427 A.2d at 1049.
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cial Appeals ruled that the use of hypnosis must satisfy the re-

quirement of acceptability for the purpose of memory retrieval in
the local scientific community before it would be admitted into
evidence. 39 The court thus used the Frye rule to nullify the earlier
holding in Harding.4° It should be noted, however,
that the Har41
ding rule is followed in several jurisdictions.
The divergence of jurisdictional viewpoints regarding the use of
hypnotically enhanced testimony has created some confusion in

California. Traditionally, California held that such testimony was
inadmissible at trial.42 In People v. Blair,4 3 however, the Supreme

Court of California proposed that hypnotically derived testimony
would be admissible if it were used to establish a basis for expert

opinion.44 In Blair, the defendant was convicted of two counts of

first-degree murder. 45 At trial, the defense attempted to introduce

into evidence statements given by a neighbor of the victims', induced while under hypnosis, regarding the physical description of

the murderers. 46 The trial
court excluded the testimony and the
47
defendant was convicted.

39. The fact that hypnosis was a scientific technique led the Polk court to analyze
whether the use of hypnosis was acceptable as a scientific method of proof in the local
community. See generally, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
40. The Polk court did not expressly overrule Harding. The court distinguished
Harding by stating that the Frye principle was not applicable in Maryland at the time
the Harding decision was rendered. As such, the Polk court remanded the case so
that the trial court could make a determination as to whether hypnosis was a scientifically accepted method of proof in the local community. Polk at 391, 427 A.2d at
1046-47. Hardingwas subsequently overruled. See Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186,
447 A.2d 1272 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982) in which the court held that hypnosis was not a
scientifically accepted method of proof as measured by the Frye standard.
41. For views following the Harding rule, see supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
42. See People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
43. 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979).
44. Id. at 665, 602 P.2d at 754, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 834. In California, the origin of
the rule that hypnosis could be used to establish a basis for expert opinion resulted
from People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963). The
holding in Modesto, however, clearly recognized the discretion of the trial judge to
weigh the probative value of the expert's opinion against the risk that the jury might
consider such testimony as offered for its truth. The trial court judge thus had the
discretion to exclude such testimony under Modesto.
45. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d at 640, 602 P.2d at 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
46. Id. at 664-66, 602 P.2d at 753, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
47. Id. Other courts have also excluded hypnotic testimony which would exculpate the defendant. See e.g., Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120-21
(W.D. Va. 1976) (defendant's statements made while under hypnosis were held inadmissible and not contrary to constitutional principles). See also State v. Pusch, 77
N.D. 860, 46 N.W. 2d 508 (1950) (defendant's hypnotically enhanced exculpatory
statement was excluded). But cf. State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983)
(hypnosis affects credibility rather than admissibility of evidence). Note that North
Dakota has now adopted the Harding rule. The Brown court, however, attempted to
distinguish the Pusch case. The distinguishing feature was that Brown involved the
issue of whether one may testify after memory recollection had been refreshed by the
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The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court in Blair.48 Although the testimony of the victims' neighbor
derived by the use of hypnosis was inadmissible, the court proposed that hypnotically enhanced testimony would be admissible
if offered to establish a basis for expert opinion. 49 The Supreme
Court of California expressly stated, however, that testimony elicited by the use of hypnosis would not be admissible to prove the
truthfulness or accuracy of a statement.50
Although Blair expressly excluded hypnotically enhanced testimony when offered for its truth; it was apparent that momentum
was building in favor of admissibility of such testimony in California.5 ' The Blair decision opened the door and proposed to admit hypnotically derived testimony, albeit for the limited purpose
of establishing a basis for expert opinion. This proposal would
permit hypnotically enhanced testimony to be admitted into evidence in at least one instance. Additionally, at about the same
use of hypnosis. The court concluded that such a witness may testify, however, the
hypnotic session could affect the credibility of the testimony. Brown, 337 N.W.2d at
147. Pusch, on the other hand, involved the issue of whether recorded statements of
the defendant-made while under hypnotic induction-could be used as substantive
evidence. Thus, the Brown court determined that an entirely different issue was
presented for resolution.
The Brown court also listed several factors to be considered in determining whether
the testimony is credible. These factors included: (1) a valid investigatory purpose
necessitating the use of hypnosis to refresh recollection, (2) a qualified and trained
hypnotist conducting the hypnotic session, (3) whether a recording of the hypnotic
session was made, (4) whether notice was provided to the defense that a state witness
has been hypnotized, (5) whether the witness had an ample opportunity to view the
alleged assailant, and (6) special jury instructions explaining that a witness was hypnotized and detailing the surrounding circumstances of the hypnotic session.
Note that among the Brown factors to be considered in weighing the credibility of
the testimony is that notice be given to the defense that a state witness has been hypnotized. This requirement is seemingly consistent with constitutional principles. See,
e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant is contrary to due process). See additionally, United
States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1969); Emmet v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp.,
1025, 1040-41 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (prosecutor has a duty to disclose the fact that a hypnotic session was conducted with prosecution witnesses).
48. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d at 667, 602 P.2d at 755, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
49. Id., at 665, 602 P.2d at 754, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
50. Id. Note that the statements made under hypnosis which the expert would
use to form his opinion would not be hearsay. See McCoRMICK, supra note 33, at
§ 246 offering the following definition of hearsay: "Hearsay evidence is testimony in
court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for
its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." Thus, any statement made
under hypnosis which the expert would use to form an opinion would not be hearsay
because the hypnotic statement would not be offered for its truth. The statement
would merely be offered to show the basis for the expert's opinion.
51. See People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897) excluding hypnotically
enhanced testimony in all cases. The Blair decision eroded this traditional rule to
some degree.
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time, hypnosis was being ruled as an adequate means of facilitating the memory recollections of witnesses in New York and New
Jersey.5 2 Confusion was thus created, necessitating argument of
the case of People v. Shirley53 before the California Supreme

Court in 1982.
III.

THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. SHIRLEY

A.

The Alleged Crime

The case of People v. Shirley54 presented the Supreme Court of
California with the opportunity to rule once again on the issue of
hypnotically enhanced testimony. In the case, Catherine Crump
awoke on the evening of January 25, 1979 in her home and discovered Donald Lee Shirley standing in front of her naked. 55
Shirley took Crump into a bedroom and thereafter raped her, as
well as forcing the performance of various acts of oral
56
copulation.
Crump was vaguely able to recall the events of the previous
evening when she reported the incident to the authorities early the
next morning.5 7 On April 30, 1979, Crump was hypnotized in order to refresh her recollection of the incident.5 8 After the hypnotic
session, Crump was able to recall the details of the incident which
59
she had previously been unable to remember.
Crump was permitted to testify against Shirley at trial 6° which
resulted in a conviction of rape. 6 1 Shirley appealed to the
52. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); People v. Lewis, 103 Misc.
2d 881, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1980); People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 427
N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1980). See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the general applicability of these cases.
53. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, mod. 31 Cal. 3d 918(a) (1982),
cert. denied 103 S.Ct. 133 (1982).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 24, 641 P.2d at 777, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 30, 641 P.2d at 781, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
58. The hypnotic session was conducted after Crump had testified at the preliminary hearing. The use of the preliminary testimony would be inadmissible as substantive evi ence as violative of the hearsay rule unless the declarant (Crump) were
shown to be unavailable as a witness. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291 (West 1966). But
see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966) holding that a statement made by a witness
is not made inadmissible if the statement is inconsistent with the testimony at the
hearing (trial). Thus, such prior testimony at the preliminary hearing would be admissible if offered for impeachment purposes.
59. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 30, 641 P.2d at 781, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
60. Id. at 23, 641 P.2d at 776, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45. There were two witnesses
concerning this alleged crime; Crump as the complaining witness, and the defendant
Shirley. The testimony of the two witnesses conflicted, however, the jury believed
part of Crump's testimony as Shirley was convicted of rape but acquitted of oral
copulation.
61. Id. at 18, 641 P.2d at 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
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Supreme Court of California which granted a hearing and rendered a decision on March 11, 1982.62
.

The Holding of Shirley

63
The California Supreme Court reversed Shirley's conviction.
In ruling that the testimony of a witness who submits to hypnosis
in order to refresh his recollection of the incident is not admissible
as evidence, the court adopted the Frye rule and excluded the testimony. 64 The court reasoned that hypnosis was too unreliable a
phenomenon to be admitted into evidence. 65 Hypnosis as a scientifically accepted technique was not sufficiently accurate in the local community to justify admission as evidence at the present
time. 66 The justices looked to the treatment which other jurisdictions had given to the hypnosis issue and rendered
new rules re67
garding the use of post-hypnotic testimony.
The new rules as enunciated by the Supreme Court of California can be summarized as follows: 1) Hypnotically enhanced testimony is not admissible as evidence in a California court of

law. 68 A witness cannot testify as to the events in issue from the

time of the hypnotic session forward; 69 2) The rule rendered in
Shirley would apply to all cases not yet final as of the date of the
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The Frye rule conditions the admissibility of a new scientific method of proof
upon a showing that the technique be accepted as reliable in the community in which
it is used. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See supra notes
22-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Frye rule.
65. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 56, 641 P.2d at 798, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
66. The Supreme Court of California has also invoked the Frye rule to determine
the admissibility of other scientific methods of proof. See People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d
636, 343 P.2d 577 (1959) (en banc) excluding testimony derived by the use of truth
serum. See also People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1976) excluding an identification made through the use of voiceprint analysis.
67. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273. But see
the limitations placed on this rule. A witness may testify on a topic wholly unrelated
to the events that were the subject of the hypnotic session. Additionally, the court
recognized the use of hypnosis for investigative purposes.
68. Id. The result of this ruling was aperse exclusion of the use of testimony
derived from hypnosis. The rule was consistent with traditional California case law
which excluded hypnotically enhanced testimony, see People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652,
49 P. 1049 (1897). Additionally, the California Supreme Court distinguished the prior
case law, apparently to the contrary, of People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d 33,
31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963) and People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 818 (1979) by stating that both Modesto and Blair held that testimony elicited
by the use of hypnosis could only be used for the limited purpose of establishing
expert opinion.
69. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273. Under the
rule in Shirley a witness is incompetent to testify when the testimony relates to the
events that were the subject of the hypnotic session.
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decision.70
Shortly thereafter, the California Supreme Court modified the
holding in Shirley.71 The modifications were: 1)When a criminal
defendant submits to pretrial hypnosis, the hypnotic session will
not render his testimony inadmissible as evidence. 72 This modifi73
cation was made to avoid infringing upon the fundamental right
74
of an accused defendant to testify in his own behalf; 2) The rule
governing the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony of
a witness would only apply to those witnesses hypnotized as of the
date of the Shirley decision. 75 No position was taken at this time
regarding76 witnesses hypnotized before the date of the Shirley
decision.
The modifications of Shirley present several issues which must
be addressed and analyzed: 1) the People of the State of California are denied due process of law when a defendant testifies on his
own behalf after the use of pretrial hypnosis;77 2) if the fundamental right of the defendant to testify on his own behalf outweighs
the interest of the People to due process, the Supreme Court of
California may wish to adopt procedural safeguards to be used
when a defendant submits to pretrial hypnosis; 78 and 3) the extent
to which the Shirley decision should be applied retroactively in
70. Id.
71. 31 Cal. 3d 918(a), 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273. The California Reports (Cal. 3d)
printed the modified decision separately, while the California Reporter incorporated
the modifications into the original report of the case. The Pacific Reporter did not
incorporate the modification into the printed opinion.
72. Id. at 67, 181 Cal Rptr. at 273. According to this modification of Shirley, if
the defendant submits to the use of hypnosis, such a procedure will not result in the
exclusion of his testimony at trial if he elects to testify on his own behalf.
73. A fundamental right is either expressly enumerated within the first eight
amendments to the Constitution of the United States or implicitly within the Ninth
Amendment's general reservation of rights retained by the People although not expressly mentioned in any particular section or amendment to the Constitution. See
generally, Kent, Under the Ninth Amendment What Rights Are the "Others Retained
By the PeopleP" 29 FED. B. J. 219 (1970).
74. See People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 466 P.2d 710, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1970)
where the defendant accused of a crime was permitted to testify on his own behalf
contrary to advice given by counsel so as to prevent the infringement of one's fundamental right to testify in his own behalf.
75. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 67, n.53, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273 n.53. This modification
was not printed in the unofficial Pacific regional reporter.
76. Id.
77. The People of the State of California acting collectively are entitled to due
process of law. The laws of California require that in an action in which one is
charged with a crime, the action in the name of the people must be subscribed by the
District Attorney. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 739 (West 1970). Additionally, CAL.
Gov. CODE ANN. § 26500 (West 1968) reads as follows: "The district attorney is the
public prosecutor.
He shall attend the courts, and conduct on behalf of the people all prosecutions for
public offenses."
78. See infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
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These issues will now be analyzed and

IV. THE DEFENDANT EXCEPTION RULE OF PEOPLE V SHIRLEY
A.

The Right of the People to Due Process of Law

In a criminal prosecution the People of the State of California
are entitled to due process of law.80 It is unequivocally clear that
the accuser, as well as the accused, has an interest in seeing that all
due process requirements are met.8' The mere fact that this right

is not explicitly mentioned in any particular section or amendment to the United States Constitution does not render this right

immaterial.8 2 This right is implicitly within the Ninth Amend83
ment's reservation of rights.
Accepting the premise that the People acting collectively are entitled to due process of law in a criminal prosecution, the issue
becomes whether permitting a defendant to testify on his own behalf after submission to pretrial hypnosis infringes upon the right
of the People to due process. In Shirley, the California Supreme

Court held that hypnosis was unreliable as a scientific method of
proof because of oversuggestiveness, the desire of the subject to
please the hypnotist, and the inability of the subject to distinguish

real memory from distortedmemory.84 The perceived problem is

79. See infra notes 118-58 and accompanying text.
80. The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the interest of the People
in the administration of criminal justice in the case of United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974) when the Court stated: "We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice."
Id. at 713.
81. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 197 (1953): "The people of the State
are also entitled to due process of law."; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947):
"Society also has a right to a fair trial."; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122
(1934): "But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep
the balance true."
82. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). A fundamental right to privacy exists in both the concept of liberty vis-a-vis the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment and in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of fundamental rights. See
also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
The right to privacy is found within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
83. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX reads as follows: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the People." The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the due process
interest that the People acting collectively maintain. See supra note 80 and accompanying text discussing the application of the case of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974).
84. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65, 641 P.2d 775, 803, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
271-72 (1982).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss2/7

14

Ingrassia: People v. Shirley: The Use of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony at
1984]

PEOPLE V SHIRLEY

the development by the subject of a distorted version of the inci-

dent due to the influence of the hypnotist. Additionally, the subject will have the conviction that his memory of the incident after

the use of hypnosis is completely accurate. 85 This distortion will
render traditional legal techniques such as cross-examination

much less effective. 86 Stated another way, permitting the defendant to testify on his own behalf after the use of hypnosis may re-

sult in unreliable memory perceptions and thus render the
prosecutor's tool of cross-examination ineffective. Such unrelia-

bility in the use of hypnosis and the reduction of the prosecutor's
effectiveness during cross-examination can be interpreted as a de87
nial of the People's right to due process of law.
There is a dichotomy between the fundamental right of a de-

fendant to testify on his own behalf after the use of pretrial hypnosis, and the right of the People to due process in a criminal
prosecution. 88 One can state, however, that permitting the accused to testify on his own behalf after hypnosis is necessary in
order to protect the defendant's liberty interest. 89 Thus, the right
85. Id. at 65, 641 P.2d at 803, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
86. See id.
87. The People are denied due process of law under the 14th Amendment regarding their interest in the administration of justice in a criminal prosecution when one
may testify contrary to the established principles of evidence law. For example, a
defendant may not testify if he refuses to take the oath on the stand. CAL. EVID.
CODE § 710 (West 1966). Additionally, the defendant may not present hearsay testimony except as provided by law. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1200 (West 1966). See also
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 77-78, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 279-80 (1982) (Kaus, J.,
concurring and dissenting) from the modified decision:
Finally, it seems to me that if the majority opinion is correct, then the exception which the opinion establishes for previously hypnotized defendants
who wish to testify is unsupportable. Whether the right to testify in one's
defense is "fundamental". . . or constitutional. . . there can be no right to
offer testimony which suffers from all of the potential vices which have triggered the majority's total ban on the testimony of hypnotized witnesses.
While I have tried to explain why, in my opinion, the majority goes much
too far, if the majority's reasoning is correct, I can see no basis for excepting
the defendant on trial.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. For a discussion of the right of the criminal defendant to testify on his own
behalf see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
89. The accused has a liberty interest that is affected since conviction of a crime
could result in a prison sentence. For example, in California approximately twothirds of all convicted felony offenders are sentenced to a prison or jail term. See
generally POPE,

SENTENCING OF CALIFORNIA FELONY OFFENDERS

(National Crimi-

nal Justice Information and Statistics Service 1975). Additionally, the accused's liberty interest is protected by the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ I reads in part as follows: "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Due process has been defined with respect to liberty and justice. See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926) offering the following
explanation of due process: "What it [due process] does require is that state action,
whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental
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of the individual defendant to testify after the use of hypnosis may
be greater than the interest of the People to due process in a criminal prosecution. The rationale for this statement lies in the fact
that we hold a defendant's liberty to be superior to the interests of
the People, collectively, to due process. 90 Under this analysis, one
can conclude that a defendant should be permitted to testify on
his own behalf even after the use of pretrial hypnosis.
Even if the right of the accused to testify after pretrial hypnosis
outweighs the interests of the People to due process in a criminal
prosecution, the Supreme Court of California has failed to address how the reliability of such testimony will be increased. The
solution to this problem may be to examine the rationale used by
other jurisdictions to increase the likelihood that hypnotically enhanced testimony is reliable. These jurisdictions have adopted
procedural safeguards to be used before, during and after the hypnotic session. It is believed that these procedural safeguards help
to increase the reliability of testimony elicited through the use of
hypnosis. 91
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions. . . ." Id. at 316. Due process has also been recognized as that which is
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169
(1952); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
90. The accused's liberty interest is protected by the fact that the prosecution
must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant a conviction. See 23 C.J.S.
CriminalLaw § 910 (1961). See also People v. Dewberry, 51 Cal. 2d 548, 334 P.2d
852 (1959) where the Supreme Court of California held that guilt must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict.
91. For a discussion of the procedural safeguards initiated in New Jersey see infra note 98 and accompanying text. Compare with People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881,
883, 427 N.Y.S. 2d 177, 179 (Sup. Ct. 1980) and People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d
831, 834-36, 427 N.Y.S. 2d 181, 182-83 (Sup. Ct. 1980) requiring the following
safeguards:
(1) Hypnotist must be specially trained in the use of hypnosis, and preferably be a
psychiatrist or psychologist.
(2) Specially trained person should not be informed of the case verbally. The hypnotist should receive written memoranda outlining the pertinent facts. Care should be
exercised to avoid communication that might influence the hypnotist's opinion.
(3) Hypnotist should be independent of the prosecution and defense.
(4) All contact between the hypnotist and the subject should be videotaped from begnn to end.
pReresentatives of the prosecution or defendant should not be in the same room
with the hypnotist while he is working with the subject.
(6) Subject should be examined by a mental health professional prior to hypnosis to
exclude the possibility that the subject is physically or mentally ill and to confirm that
the subject possesses sufficient judgment and reason to comprehend what is
happening.
(7) The hypnotist should elicit a detailed description of the facts as the subject believes them to be prior to the use of hypnosis.
(8) The hypnotist should avoid adding any new element to the subject's description
of his experience, including any implicit or explicit cues during the pre-session contact, the actual hypnosis, and the post-session contact.
(9) Consideration should be given to any other evidence tending to corroborate or
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B.

ProceduralSafeguards

1. Case Law Analysis
a trial court in New Jersey examined the use
In State v.
of procedural safeguards to be followed during the hypnotic session. In Hurd, an individual was attacked and stabbed repeatedly
in her apartment. 93 The victim survived the ordeal but was unable to describe the assailant. 94 The victim was hypnotized by the
local authorities in order to refresh her recollection of the incident
trial court
and was thereafter able to describe her assailant. 95 The
96
did not admit the victim's testimony into evidence.
The trial court in Hurd established a two-pronged test when determining whether hypnotically enhanced testimony may be admitted into evidence. 97 First, the court adopted the following
procedural safeguards to be used before, during and after the hypnotic session:
(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis.
(2) The qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session
should be independent of and not responsible to the prosecutor,
investigator or the defense.
(3) Any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement
personnel prior to the hypnotic session must be in written form
Hurd92

challenge the information garnered during the trance or as a result of the posthypnotic suggestion.
Note, that the procedural safeguards in New York are somewhat more stringent
than those of New Jersey. The two trial courts in New York have essentially adopted
the six procedural safeguards for the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony set forth
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. New York, however, added the additional requirements of examination of the subject by a mental health professional, consideration of corroborative or contradictory evidence, and the earning that the hypnotist
should avoid adding any new elements to the subject's description of his experience.
It should be noted, however, that the New York safeguards are only suggestions by
two trial courts. This issue has recently reached the New York Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals determined that hypnosis is not yet sufficiently reliable as a
scientific method of proof to warrant its admission as evidence at the present time.
See People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983). The
Hughes court, however, expressly stated that a witness may be permitted to testify
with respect to his prehypnotic recollection. Id. at 545, 453 N.E.2d at 495, 466
N.Y.S.2d at 266. The court held that the proponent of the testimony would assume
the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony as to the
prehypnotic recollection of the witness is reliable and that cross-examination would
not be inhibited. Id. at 547, 453 N.E.2d at 497, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 268. Additionally,
the jury should be instructed that a hypnotic session occurred and would be able to
weigh that factor when deliberating
92. 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (Law Div. 1980), affd, 86 N.J. 525, 432
A.2d 86 (1981).
93. Id. at 335, 414 A.2d at 293.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 335, 414 A.2d at 293-94.
96. Id. at 369, 414 A.2d at 309.
97. Id. at 363, 414 A.2d at 306.
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so that subsequently the extent of the information the subject
received from the hypnotist may be determined.
(4) Before induction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain
from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them, carefully avoiding adding any new elements to the witness' description of the events.
(5) All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should
be recorded so that a permanent record is available for comparison and study to establish that the witness has not received
information or suggestions which might later be reported as
having been first described by the subject during hypnosis.
Videotape should be employed if possible, but should not be
mandatory.
(6) Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during
any phase of the hypnotic session, including the prehypnotic
testing and post-hypnotic interview. 98
The trial court in Hurd placed the burden of proof upon the party
seeking to introduce the hypnotically enhanced testimony to establish by clear and convincing evidence 99 that it had followed the
standards of the procedural safeguards. 1°° Additionally, if the
party introducing the hypnotically derived testimony had followed the procedural safeguards, the proponent would than have
a second burden of showing that there was neither oversuggestiveness nor forceful conduct exerted by the hypnotist and those individuals conducting the hypnotic session. 10 This second prong of
the Hurd test for admissibility also required a showing by clear
and convincing evidence in order to admit the testimony.102
The trial court's application of the two-pronged test of admissibility to the facts in Hurd determined that the State, as the proponent of the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony in the case,
had failed to comply with the procedural safeguards to be used
during the hypnotic session and that the hypnotist and law enforcement personnel had coerced the victim to submit to hypnosis.103 Consequently, the trial court excluded the use of the
98. Id. For a comparison of the Hurd - New Jersey procedural safeguards with
those of New York, see supra note 91 and accompanying text. The Hurd safeguards
have been adopted in New Mexico; see State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246
(Ct. App. 1982).
99. This standard of proof is used in the traditional lineup cases which exclude
evidence of a pretrial lineup identification if the procedures employed by the authorities were unnecessarily suggestive unless under the totality of the circumstances the
State shows by clear and convincing evidence that the identification was reliable. See
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199
(1972).
100. Hurd, at 365, 414 A,2d at 306-07.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 367, 414 A.2d at 307-08. Analogy to procedural safeguards in criminal
custodial interrogation cases can be helpful here. The Supreme Court of the United
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testimony as evidence.'°4
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the decision.10 5
The court adopted the two-pronged test of admissibility enunci-

ated by the trial court.106 The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the burden of establishing admissibility by clear and

convincing evidence would place a great restraint on the use of

hypnosis prior to criminal trials.10 7 The court justified the burden,
however, by stating that the genuine oversuggestiveness present
during the use of hypnosis created the necessity of adopting a
strict burden of proof to condition the admissibility of such evidence. 0 8 Such a burden would increase the likelihood that the
evidence derived from pretrial hypnosis was reliable.109
California, of course, is not limited to merely adopting the safeguards enunciated by New Jersey in Hurd. Additional procedural
safeguards could be employed which would further increase the
reliability of the hypnotic testimony.
2. Additional ProceduralSafeguards
The Supreme Court of California should first require the defendant to show that he has had an actual lapse in memory which

necessitates the use of pretrial hypnosis."l0 There should also be a
requirement that an order from a magistrate be a necessary pre-

requisite before any pretrial hypnotic session with a defendant is
conducted. 1 " Furthermore, the hypnotist could be required to instruct the subject immediately after he enters the hypnotic state to
the effect that the hypnotist does not desire to be suggestive nor

States adopted the Miranda warnings to be used as procedural safeguards prior to
custodial interrogation in order to secure the privilege against self-incrimination and
increase the likelihood that any confession obtained during interrogation was voluntary. See generally, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
104. Hurd, at 369, 414 A.2d at 309.
105. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
106. Id. at 545-49, 432 A.2d at 96-98.
107. Id. at 546-47, 432 A.2d at 97. For a discussion that this burden on the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony was not justified in Hurd,see Comment,
The Admissibility of Hyonodcally Induced Recollection, 70 KY. L. J. 187 (1981-82).
This Comment suggested that the use of hypnotically derived testimony should go
toward the weight as opposed to the admissibility of the evidence.
108. Hurd, at 546-47, 432 A.2d at 97.
109. Id.
110. This requirement would be consistent with State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432
A.2d 86 (1981). In Hurd, the burden was on the proponent of the use of hypnosis to
show that the procedural safeguards were followed. Here the burden would be on the
proponent-defendant to show that he has an actual lapse in memory which requires
the use of pretrial hypnosis to refresh his recollection.
111. See Note, Admissibility, supra note 10, at 1229-30. The Note suggests that a
preliminary hearing before the use of pretrial hypnosis is permitted would help to
increase the reliability of such testimony and provide more certainty in the hypnotic
process.
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will the hypnotist be pleased unless the subject actually describes
the incident as he truly remembers."l 2 This instruction could reduce the possibility that the subject would distort fact and fantasy
in order to please the hypnotist, thereby increasing the likelihood
113
that the hypnotized subject actually told the truth.
It has yet to be determined whether procedural safeguards will
absolutely increase the likelihood that the testimony derived is reliable. 114 If a defendant is permitted to testify on his own behalf
after the use of pretrial hypnosis, some standards should be
adopted which will increase the likelihood that the testimony derived is reliable. 115 Certainly, adoption of procedural safeguards
for pretrial hypnotic sessions are better than no safeguards at all.
The present rule as rendered in Shirley requires no procedural
safeguards. 116 The California Supreme Court would do well to
adopt procedural safeguards for use when a defendant is
hypnotized.
Increased reliability by the use of procedural safeguards, of
course, cannot be the end of the discussion. A problem still arises
when the subject of retroactivity of the Shirley decision is confronted. The Supreme Court of California left this issue unresolved in its modified decision."l 7 The problem must thus be
analyzed to determine the extent to which retroactivity should be
employed.
V.

THE RETROACTIVITY OF SHIRLEY

A.

OverrulingBackground

There are several overruling techniques that may be used by a
court of law. 118 The Supreme Court of California has no consis112. F. MONAGHAN, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 74 (1980).
113. Id. The instruction could alleviate the problems that are present during the

suggestive process of hypnosis. The instruction is necessary because the subject has a
desire to please the hypnotist while under the hypnotic state. The use of the instruction would inform the subject that the hypnotist would not be pleased unless the
subject actually told the truth. The theory is that the subject would thereby describe
the incident as he remembers it. There is thus an increase in the likelihood that the
testimony elicited is reliable.
114. See Diamond,supra note 13, at 333 stating that regardless of the manner in
which the hypnotic session is conducted, the hypnotized individual cannot be free
from heightened suggestibility and the hypnotist will be unable to avoid implanting
suggestions in the mind of the subject.
115. See supra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
116. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, mod.
31 Cal. 3d 918(a) (1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
117. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
118. See Perrello, Jr. & Golembiewski, Retroactivity of CalforniaSupreme Court
Decisions: A ProceduralStep TowardFairness, 17 CAL. W. L. REV. 403, 403-05 (1981)
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tent set of overruling standards," 19 however the Supreme Court of

the United States has established consistent overruling guidelines

for new rules of law. 20 The Fourth District Court of Appeals in
California has followed the overruling guidelines established by
the United States Supreme Court as a plausible approach to the
retroactivity problem. Moreover, in People v. Williamsl 2' the
Fourth District Court of Appeals squarely addressed the issue of
22
whether the Shirley decision should be retroactively applied.'
B. A CaliforniaAppellate Approach
In People v. Williams, 23 the defendant was convicted of rape

and robbery. 124 The conviction was based almost entirely upon
the testimony of a complaining witness who was hypnotized in
order to refresh her memory of the events in issue. 125 At the time
the hypnotic session was conducted the Shirley rule had not yet
been enunciated, however before review at the appellate level, the
Shirley decision was rendered by the California Supreme
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Perrello & Golembiewski, Retroactivity]. The
authors here suggest that the following overruling techniques can be employed:
(1) Full Retroactivity - The benefits of the new rule apply to all petitioners before
the court and to all litigants to whom the former ruling has been or could be applied.
(2) FinalJudgement Rule - Applies the new rule to litigants before the court and
to all cases still on direct review.
(3) Prospectivily - Applies the new rule to the litigants before the court and to
those cases still untried when the decision was announced.
(4) Pure Prospectiviy - Apply the new rule only to future cases so that even the
petitioner to the present case does not receive the benefit of the overruling decision.
(5) Prospective- Prospective Overruling- This technique applies when the court
announces that it will change the law on a stated future date.
(6) Prospective- Retroactive Overruling - Applies the new rule retroactively only
if the legislature has not formulated a new law by a stated future date.
119. Perrello & Golembiewski, Retroactivity,supra note 118, at 405. The Supreme
Court of California has employed all of the six overruling techniques discussed in
supra note 118, except the prospective - prospective and prospective - retroactive
techniques. Prospectivity, however, has been employed for a majority of the cases in
which a new rule has been announced.
120. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) requiring analysis of the following standards to determine whether retroactivity will be employed:
(1) Examine the purpose to be served by the new standard.
(2) Examine the extent of the reliance by law enforcement officials on the old standards.
(3) Determine the effect on the administration of justice that retroactive application of the new rule would produce.
In Linkletter the issue was whether the exclusionary rule as enunciated in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) was retroactive. The Court used the overruling guidelines
listed above to determine that the Mapp rule did not require retrospective application.
Linkletter, at 640.
121. 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1982).
122. Williams, at 924, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
123. 132 Cal. App. 3d 920, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1982).
124. Williams, at 920, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
125. Id. at 922, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
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Court. 126

The Williams case thus presented the appellate court
1 27
with the retroactivity problem which Shirley left unanswered.
The Fourth District Court of Appeals examined the guidelines established by the United States Supreme Court for determining the
extent to which a new rule of law should be retroactively
28
applied.'
Accordingly, the court first examined thepurpose to be served
by the new standard which excluded hypnotically enhanced testimony at trial. 129 The purpose to be served by the rule in Shirley
was the exclusion of the process of refreshing one's recollection by
the use of hypnosis.130 The court reasoned that Shirley was a policy decision which applied to future cases in order to avoid the use
of an unreliable scientific method of proof at trial. 131 Retroactivity was thus denied under thepurpose guideline.
Secondly, the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities
on the old standard was examined. 32 The court discovered that
hypnosis was widely used by the authorities to refresh the recollection of a witness. 133 This wide use of hypnosis by law enforcement authorities indicated a great extent of reliance on
hypnotically adduced testimony prior to Shirley. Consequently,
126. Id. at 922, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
127. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of the overruling guidelines established by the United States
Supreme Court see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
129. Williams, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 500. See State ex rel.
Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982). This case involved the
issue of whether a new rule excluding hypnotically enhanced testimony should be
applied retroactively. The Collins court stated that complete retroactivity will only be
granted when the major purpose of the new rule is to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial which substantially impairs the truthfmding function and thus raises questions regarding the accuracy of guilty verdicts. Id. at 189, 644 P.2d at 1275. The
Arizona Supreme Court noted, however, that additional safeguards are present during trial which reduce the possibility that the truthfinding process is so totally damaged as to require retroactive application of the new rule. Although not expressly
mentioned in Collins, an additional safeguard would be for the judge to instruct the
jury as to the issues involved and the general principles of law that are to be applied.
See generally, People v. Koontz, 7 Cal. App. 3d 30, 86 Cal. Rptr. 374 (Ct. App. 1970);
People v. Fontes, 7 Cal. App. 3d 650, 86 Cal. Rptr. 790 (Ct. App. 1970); People v.
Bevins, 54 Cal. 2d 71, 351 P.2d 776, 4 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1960).
130. Williams, at 924, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
131. Id. at 925, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
132. Id. See Collins, 132 Ariz. at 189, 644 P.2d at 1275. In examining the reliance
guideline, if reliance on the old standards were not justified, then full retroactivity
would probably be granted. For this guideline, however, the reliance of law enforcement officials in Arizona on the use of hypnosis prior to trial weighed in favor of
prospective application. The case law in the area was divergent among the jurisdictions. Additionally, there was conflict among the experts regarding the reliability of
hypnotically enhanced testimony. Thus, law enforcement officials in Arizona had a
prior good faith reliance on the use of pretrial hypnosis.
133. Williams, at 924, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
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retroactivity was not granted under the reliance guideline. 134
Finally, the Court examined the effect that a retroactive appli135
cation of Shirley would impose on the administrationofjustice.
This guideline was the major component used by the Williams
court in determining whether Shirley should be given retrospective treatment. A balancing test was employed to determine
whether the retroactive application of Shirley would impose too
great a burden on the administration of justice.1 36 In concluding
that any retrospective treatment would hinder the effective admin-

istration of justice the court stated: "Obviously the determination
as to retroactivity involves a balancing process. .

.

. In the bal-

ancing process as to retroactivity it appears to us that considerations of judicial policy and the effective administration of justice

compel the determination that Shirley shall not be given retroactive application."'

37

Thus, the Williams court used the United

States Supreme Court's overruling guidelines and a balancing test
to determine that Shirley should be accorded prospective

application.
The determination of the prospective application of a new rule
may not completely solve the overruling problems involved. One
can still determine that an applicaiton of a new rule need not be
134. Id.
135. Id. at 924-25, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 500. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
636 (1965). Collins, 132 Ariz. at 190, 644 P.2d at 1276 (1982). When examining the
effect that a new rule would impose on the administration of justice both Linkletter
and Collins stated that not every law requires the reversal of prior convictions. There
is a need for finality in decisions and retroactivity will only be applied when there is a
denial of a fundamental right of constitutional magnitude. For example, the right to
counsel is so fundamental that any overruling decision involving this right is likely to
be accorded retroactive treatment. See generally Williams v. Alabama, 341 F.2d 777
(5th Cir. 1965); Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1964); United States ex
rel. Craig v. Myers, 329 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1964). See also Booker v. Phillips, 418 F.2d
424 (10th Cir. 1969) holding that the application of federal double jeopardy provisions apply retroactively.
136. Williams, at 924-25, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 500. Additionally, see Collins, 132 Ariz.
at 190, 644 P.2d at 1276 which stated that when the retroactive application of a new
rule imposes a substantial burden on the administration of justice then retroactivity
must be denied. The burden on the administration of justice is generally too great to
mandate the retroactive application of the new ruling when the change in law is unforeseen. In Collins, the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that since the change in
law regarding the use of pretrial hypnosis was unforeseen, retroactivity had to be
denied.
137. Williams, at 925, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 500. In the balancing approach employed
by the Williams Court there was great reliance placed on the fact that the testimony of
the hypnotized prosecution witness afforded the only basis for the conviction of the
defendant. The court concluded that the retroactive application of Shirley would result in the defendant escaping responsibility for the crime which he allegedly committed. This factor was used in the balancing process when determining the burden that
retrospective treatment of Shirley would impose on the administration of justice and
finally in the court's holding that Shirley was to be accorded prospective application.
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purely prospective. 138 Under this alternative approach, the point
in time when the prospective application of the new rule will become effective must be determined.' 39 Although the California
District Court of Appeals opted for the purely prospective application in Williams, the Arizona Supreme Court used an alternaenhanced
tive approach for a new rule excluding hypnotically
40
testimony in State ex ret Collins v. Superior Court.'
C. ProspectiveApplication -

The Arizona Approach

In Collins, the defendant was charged with kidnapping, sexual
assault, and rape. 14 1 The defendant was apprehended primarily
because several crime victims were hypnotized in an effort to aid
142
the authorities in learning the identification of the assailant.
Prior to trial, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that hypnotically
induced recall testimony was per se inadmissible as evidence.143
The Supreme Court of Arizona determined that the exclusion
of hypnotically derived testimony would be applied prospectively.
The court also focused on the point in time when the application
would become effective. 44 First, it was held that any witness hypnotized after the announcement of the new hypnotic testimony exclusion rule would be incompetent to testify. 45 Second, the
Collins court ruled that any witness hypnotized prior to the new
rule would also be incompetent to testify.' 46 Finally, for any conviction that was within the appellate process and where the testimony, as well as the hypnosis, occurred prior to the
announcement of the new rule, the issue must be examined on a
case-by-case basis. 147 This case-by-case analysis would be used to
use of the hypnotically enhanced testimony
determine whether the
was harmless error.148
138. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
139. Id.
140. 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
141. Collins, at 182, 644 P.2d at 1268 (1982).
142. Id.
143. id. The Supreme Court of Arizona had ruled that hypnotically enhanced
testimony was not admissible as evidence in State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d
1274 (1981). In Mena the Court determined that the use of hypnosis to refresh the
recollection of a prosecution witness was a denial of the criminal defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. The court based this conclusion on the belief of several
authorities that the hypnotism of a witness renders cross-examination ineffective. For
a general discussion of this theory see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to confrontation see generally, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
144. Collins, at 190, 644 P.2d at 1276.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Harmless error is unaccompanied by prejudice or injury to the defendant
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The Collins court understood that its holding was not purely
prospective in form, however it recognized the problems involved
in the prospective decisionmaking process. 149 The court focused
on the large degree of judicial discretion involved when determin150
ing the time at which a new principle of law becomes effective.
The harmless error test was thus determined to be a plausible solution to the overruling problems involved regarding the exclusion
of hypnotically enhanced testimony in Arizona.
D.

The Overruling Solution

The approaches to the overruling applications for the exclusion
of hypnotically enhanced testimony applied by both the Arizona
Supreme Court and the Fourth District Court of Appeals in California have similarities and differences. 151 Arizona's approach to
the problem is the superior solution. The use of a harmless error
test on a case-by-case basis for all convictions within the appellate
and as such, it is not grounds for reversal on appeal. Conversely, prejudicial error
would be that which affects the substantial rights of the party complaining. Seegenerally 5 CJ.S. Appeal & Error § 1676 (1958). California uses a prejudicial error test to
determine whether error in admitting testimony is reversible. See People v. Watson,
46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956). See also People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 70, 641
P.2d 775, 806, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 275 (1982) stating the following regarding Watson:
We conclude that proper application of the Watson prejudicial error test in
the present context requires the appellate court to determine whether it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would
have occurred if the testimony of the previously hypnotized witness as to all
matters relating to the events of the crime had not been admitted.
The differences between the harmless error and prejudicial error tests warrants discussion here. See MCCORMICK, supra note 33, at § 183 explaining the harmless error
test. Note that before constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must determine that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There would be a constitutional error involved in that the hypnotically enhanced testimony would be in
violation of the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI protecting the defendant's right to confrontation. Under the prejudicial
error test of Watson, however, the court need only determine whether it is reasonably
probable that a more favorable result would have occurred had the error been omitted. Under this test it is clearly more difficult to obtain a reversal for the defendant's
conviction. The proof required to maintain a conviction is lowered to the reasonably
probable standard under the prejudicial error test, while that of the constitutional
harmless error test requires a higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to
support the conviction.
149. Collins, at 190, 644 P.2d at 1276.
150. Id.
151. Both of the approaches used the overruling guidelines established by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), to
determine that a new rule excluding the use of hypnotically derived testimony should
be accorded prospective treatment. The approach employed by the Supreme Court of
Arizona in Collins differed from that of the appellate approach of California in Wrlliams, however, in that Collins addressed the point in time when the prospective application was to become effective. Additionally, Collins expressly mandated the use
of a harmless error test for all cases that were within the appellate process concerning
the hypnotic testimony retroactivity issue.
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process is more reliable than the approach used in Williams. It is
best for each case to turn on its own unique set of facts and the
harmless error test will permit courts to examine each case individually to determine whether the use of hypnotically adduced
testimony is reversible error. 152 Under the test employed by the
Arizona Supreme Court in Collins, the rights of the defendant are
more fully protected than by the approach used in Williams. The
Williams approach accords the rule in Shirley pure prospective
application as a result of a balancing of judicial policy. 53 Any
conviction resulting from hypnotically enhanced testimony prior
to Shirley would thus remain intact.154 Such would be the case
testimony were the sole basis for supporting
even if the hypnotic
55
the conviction.
The approach taken by Arizona in Collins would determine
whether the use of the hypnotic testimony was harmless with respect to the defendant's conviction. Under Collins, a criminal
conviction would be overturned where the use of hypnotically enhanced
testimony was the major factor in supporting the conviction.' 56 The Collins test thus clearly protects the rights of the
defendant in that it recognizes that convictions might be overturned in some instances. The test mandates that each case be
testiexamined individually to determine whether the hypnotic
157
mony was prejudicial to the defendant's conviction.
The California Supreme Court should use the approach taken
in Collins to determine that Shirley be given prospective application and in aiding the court in deciding the point in time at which
the prospective application would become effective. The Supreme
Court of California might first hold that any person hypnotized
pre-Shirley but who testified post-Shirley will be incompetent to
testify. Second, for convictions remaining in the process of appeal
and where both the testimony and hypnosis occurred pre-Shirley,
152. Note that the Supreme Court of California used a prejudicial error test to
determine whether a new rule was reversible error in Shirley. For a discussion of this
test see supra note 148 and accompanying text. The court can thus employ the same
test when a party seeks the retroactive benefit of the new rule.
153. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
154. The conviction would remain intact because Williams held that Shirley was
prospective. If Shirley is not applied retroactively then any conviction resulting prior
to Shirley would stand.
155. Note that the Williams court expressly stated that the hypnotic testimony was
the major basis for the conviction of the defendant. The Court actually used this
factor to the detriment of the defendant in order to uphold the conviction. For a
discussion of the court's rationale see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
156. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 190, 644 P.2d 1266,
1276 (1982).
157. Id. For a definition of prejudicial error see supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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the court might employ a case-by-case analysis as used in Collins
to determine whether the introduction of the hypnotically enhanced testimony was harmless error. Such a ruling would represent an equitable balance of the competing
interests involved and
158
be a logical place to draw the line.
It is thus apparent that any decision by the Supreme Court of
California to apply the Shirley decision prospectively may create
the additional problem of determining the point in time when the
application will become effective. The Supreme Court of Arizona's approach to this problem would be a helpful aid in determining the solution to the problem. The California Supreme
Court would be wise to follow such an insightful example.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There has been substantial debate regarding the reliability of
hypnotically enhanced testimony. The Supreme Court of California followed in the path of the majority of jurisdictions which
have addressed the issue when it rendered such testimony inad159
missible as evidence in People v. Shirley.

The California Supreme Court qualified this rule to permit a
criminal defendant, who has submitted to pretrial hypnosis, to testify on his own behalf. The rationale employed by the court regarding this exception was to prevent the infringement of the
fundamental right of an accused to testify on his own behalf' 60
This qualification could infringe on the right of the People to due
process of law in a criminal prosecution case. 161 The Supreme
Court of California may wish to balance the right of the People to
due process against the right of an accused to testify after the use
of hypnosis.' 62 If this balance favors the right of the accused to
testify, the court could adopt requisite procedural safeguards for
use before the pretrial hypnotically enhanced testimony would be
introduced into evidence.' 63 Such procedural safeguards will increase the likelihood that the testimony elicited through the use of
pretrial hypnosis is reliable.
Finally, the Supreme Court of California declined to rule on the
extent to which the decision rendered in Shirley will be applied
retroactively. Since the court has used several overruling tech158. Id.

159. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, mod. 31 Cal. 3d 918(a) (1982)
cert. denied 103 S.Ct. 133 (1982).

160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

72-74 and accompanying text.
80-90 and accompanying text.
88-90 and accompanying text.
91-113 and accompanying text.
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niques for the application of new rules in the past,164 the lack of
uniformity can create confusion as to the extent of retroactivity to
employ for the hypnotic testimony issue. The Supreme Court of
California should examine the overruling techniques which other
courts have used when addressing the retroactivity issue.' 65 Such
an examination might lead to the conclusion that the rule in Shirley should be granted prospective application, the Supreme Court
of California could exercise its judicial discretion when determining the point in time at which the prospective application would
become effective.
Frank J Ingrassia

164. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 123-58 and accompanying text.
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